Economic Isolation, Inequality, and the Suits Index of Progressivity by DUCLOS, Jean-Yves
Economic Isolation, Inequality,





Cahier de recherche 95-??
du Centre de Recherche en Économie et Finance Appliquées
CRÉFA
March 1995
Address: Département d’économique, Pavillon De Sève, Université Laval,
Québec, Canada, G1K 7P4; tel.: (418) 656-7096; fax: (418) 656-7798; email:
jduc@ecn.ulaval.ca
* This research was financed by a grant from the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada. Many thanks are due to Christophe
Muller for his helpful comments.Résumé
Nous présentons une classe de fonctions d’utilité sociale et d’indices
d’inégalité qui respectent des axiomes standard de la théorie du bien-être et qui
peuvent être reliés intuitivement à des mesures de carence relative et d’isolement
économique. Deux classes d’indices de non-proportionnalité et de redistribution
du système fiscal découlent de ces mesures. Un cas particulier et très important
de ces indices est l’indice de progressivité des taxes de Suits, un indice très
répandu pour lequel aucune justification en termes de bien-être social n’avait été
proposée auparavant. Nous illustrons l’usage de ces indices à l’aide de micro-
données britanniques sur l’impôt sur le revenu des particuliers et sur les
cotisations d’assurance sociale.
Mots clés: Progressivité, redistribution, inégalité, isolement économique.
Abstract
We present a class of social evaluation functions and inequality indices
that obey standard axioms of welfare economics and that can be intuitively
linked to measures of relative deprivation and economic isolation. From this,
associated classes of indices of tax departure from proportionality and tax
redistribution are derived. A special case of these indices is the popular Suits
index of progressivity, for which no social welfare foundation has previously
been provided. We illustrate the application of these indices using the British
regime of personal income taxes and National Insurance contributions.
Keywords: Progressivity, redistribution, inequality, economic isolation.
JEL Number: H23I. Introduction
Imagine society as a large shopping centre in which individuals purchase
and consume goods and services in proportion to their respective income.
Suppose that, while circulating in the centre, any individual can randomly
observe consumption units purchased and the income status of those acquiring
the goods and services. Let an interviewer ask a random citizen of the
supermarket the following question (Q), for an integer v greater than 1:
Q: "Are you poorer than the (v-1) individuals you last observed as
consumers?"
Finally, let the expected income of a citizen who answers yes to that question
constitute the level of social welfare
1 W of that society.
W is then symmetric, increasing with proportionate rises in the consumers’
incomes, and it obeys the Dalton transfer principle, by which a mean- and rank-
preserving transfer from a rich to a poor increases social welfare. Changing the
value of v changes our ethical attitude towards inequality and equity
2. There
corresponds to W a unique index of relative inequality, which can also be
interpreted as an indicator of economic isolation of the poor and of social
cohesion. From W, we can derive a general class of indices of tax departure
from proportionality, for which a special case is the well-known Suits (1977)
index of progressivity. An intuitive and coherent social welfare interpretation can
then be provided for that popular index of progressivity. A transformation of
these generalised Suits indices yields the tax redistributive effect, which measures
the fall in inequality induced by taxation.
1 We use interchangeably the terms "social welfare functions" and "social
evaluation functions".
2 This is in the spirit of Donaldson and Weymark (1980) and Yitzhaki (1983)
who present a generalised Gini coefficient that also depends on a parameter of
distributional sensitivity. For a clear overview of that literature, see Lambert
(1993).
1We proceed by presenting in Section II some definitions and the derivation
of a class of social evaluation functions and associated indices of inequality.
Section III shows how the valuation of social welfare and inequality depends on
the parameter v, and how the valuation of each varies when we move from a
very unequal to a perfectly equal distribution of income. Sections IV and V
derive the associated class of indices of tax departure from proportionality and
of tax redistribution. Using these indices, we decompose the change in inequality
induced by taxation. Section VI illustrates the use of the indices through an
application to personal income taxes and National Insurance Contributions in
Britain. Section VII concludes. In line with much of the conventional practice in
the theoretical literature on the measurement of progressivity and inequality, we
assume throughout that pre-tax incomes are exogenous.
II. Definitions
Let FX be the distribution of incomes X, with minimum and maximum
incomes respectively given by a and z, with z>a³0. We have that X(p)=FX
-1(p).









, with p FX (y)
and where µX is the mean of X. LX(p) shows the proportion of total income held
by those individuals with X(p) and less in the income distribution. Hence,
1-LX(p) is the proportion of society’s total consumption made by those with
incomes greater than X(p). Let
(2) KX(p) v[ 1 L X(p)]
v 1
with v>1. We can interpret KX(p) as v times the probability that, in (v-1) random
and independent observations of consumption units, the income of all observed
consumers exceed X(p). Note that KX(p) is equivalently the probability that an
individual with X(p) answer yes to the question Q posed in the introduction by
2the social welfare interviewer. Now integrate that probability over all individuals






wX(v) thus equals v times the population proportion answering yes to question
Q. KX(p)/wX(v) is then the density of individuals with income X(p) conditional
to a yes reply to Q. We shall see later that wX(v) enters nicely the inequality
index on which the Suits index of progressivity is implicitly based.
Now define the level of social welfare for distribution FX,W X (v), as the









We can show that WX(v) is symmetric, increasing along income rays
3, and
quasi-concave in incomes X. It thus belongs to the general class of Schur-
concave social welfare functions defined in Dasgupta, Sen and Starret (1973) and
for which partial orderings of distributions may be made using the Lorenz
criterion. WX(v) is also homothetic. By Blackorby and Donaldson (1978), we can
then define a unique index of relative inequality, IX(v), corresponding to WX(v),
with









3 This corresponds to the concept of "scale improvement" efficiency defined
by Shorrocks (1983). WX(v) may not be increasing in the income level of any
individual since it is not an "individualistic" social welfare function. As
Shorrocks (1983,p.12) explains, "if income differences are a source of envy, or
are socially divisive for some other reason [e.g., causing relative deprivation or
economic isolation, see below], we cannot presume that an increase in the
income of one individual will not have repercussions on the welfare levels of
others that lead to an overall reduction in welfare. In these circumstances it
seems questionable whether it should be treated as axiomatic that an increment
to any person’s income necessarily improves the standard of welfare".
3and
(6) WX (v) µX [1 IX (v)] .
The index IX(v) is thus symmetric, scale invariant, and Schur-convex, and it thus
obeys the Dalton principle of transfers. Integrating by parts equation (5), we also
find:




















Equations (5) and (7) show that IX(v) is a subclass of the Mehran (1976) class
of linear inequality measures, for which Pfähler (1987) and Duclos (1993) derive
general classes of tax progressivity, tax redistribution, and horizontal inequity
indices.
III. Parameter Sensitivity
The parameter v in question Q can usefully be seen as a parameter of
distributional sensitivity. It is analogous, for instance, to the relative inequality
aversion parameter of Atkinson (1970) and to the parameters generalising the
Gini coefficients in Donaldson and Weymark (1980), Yitzhaki (1983), and
Chakravarty (1988). As v approaches 1, we become less and less concerned
about inequality and equity, and we have that
(8) lim
vÞ1
IX(v) 0 ; lim
vÞ1
WX (v) µX
Conversely, as v approaches infinity, we become more and more concerned about
the welfare of the least well-off members of the society. Recalling that a is the
minimum income, we note that
(9) lim
vÞ¥





Integrating (5) leads to the following useful result:











Inspection of (3) and (10) reveals that, for a given µX,W Xis large when LX(p)
is close to p, the line of perfect equality. If L(p)=p, for all p between 0 and 1,
then wX(v)=1 and WX(v)=µX. In conditions of extreme inequality, IX(v) = 1-1/v
and WX ( v )=µ X /v. We thus note that





£ WX(v) £ µX .
A simple transformation of (3) indicates that
(13) wX(v) v õ
ó v 1 [1 LX (p) ]
v 1 dp .
We can then give the following interpretation to wX(v). Allocate v$ to a
random individual on the condition that he must forego this allocation if, in the
next (v-1) units of consumption he observes, he comes across someone that is
poorer than him. The more equal the distribution of income, the better
represented the poor will be, on average, in these observations of consumption.
wX(v) is then the expected amount that such an individual will not have to forego
in his (v-1) observations, and it can therefore be interpreted as an indicator of
social incohesion and of economic isolation of the poor. If we believe private
charity to be spurred by encounters between the rich and the poor when in the
process of consuming goods and services, 1/wX(v) can also be seen as an index
of the intensity of private charity. By equation (10), social welfare is at its
greatest when the consumption interaction between the rich and the poor is
maximised. From equation (10), we note that the index of inequality IX(v) is an
increasing function of the ineffective interaction between the poor and the rich
in their consumption activities.
5IV. Indices of Tax Departure From Proportionality
Now define the tax schedule by T(X), with T(X)³0, "X³0, and net income










If we define IT
*(v) as the following weighted average of differences between the


















we can obtain the following class of v-sensitive indices of the difference between
inequality in the distribution of taxes and inequality in the distribution of pre-tax
incomes:









S(v) is thus a function of weighted distances between proportional and actual
taxation. As such, it qualifies as an index of tax departure from proportionality
and is homogeneous of degree zero in the tax schedule T(X).
Table 1 gives minimum and maximum values for IT
*(v) and S(v). These
are obtained when all taxes are paid by the poorest and by the richest individual,
respectively. They thus correspond to index values for extreme regressivity and
extreme progressivity. When T(X) is progressive
4, we can show that IT
*(v)>IX(v)
4 A tax system is said to be progressive if the average tax rate increases with
the level of pre-tax income [e.g., see Jakobsson (1976)], viz, if d[T(X)/X]/dX>0.
6and S(v)>0. The intermediate index values that occur for a proportional tax
system are also shown.















, with p FX (y) .
LT(p) shows the percentage of total taxes paid by individuals with X(p) and less.
Graphically, the Suits index measures twice the area between the Lorenz curve
LX(p) and the concentration curve LT(p) when both of these curves are plotted
against LX(p). For a proportional tax, LX and LT coincide and the Suits index
equals zero. Integrating by parts equation (17) and using equation (18), we can
check that the Suits index is simply S(2). From Table 1, we confirm that the
Suits index varies from -1 to 1 between extreme regressivity and extreme
progressivity. Since the Gini coefficient of inequality in the distribution of X is
defined as





we can also show that the indices of economic isolation and inequality
corresponding to the Suits index of tax departure from proportionality are
wX(2)=1+GX and IX(2)= GX/(1+GX).
The S(v) index for the overall tax system can easily be decomposed as a
sum of the indices of component taxes (e.g., indirect taxes, personal income
taxes, social insurance contributions). Denote each of M component taxes as Tm,














which is a simple weighted average of the component Sm(v).
V. Indices of Tax Redistribution
The redistributive impact of the tax system, R(v)=IX(v)-IN(v), can be
expressed as a function of S(v). Assume, for expositional simplicity, that the tax
system does not rerank individuals. We can then show that

























The first term on the right of (22) is a generalisation of an index of the
redistributive effect of taxation derived in Pfähler (1983). Once it is normalised
by wX(v), this term has the simplicity of multiplying the index S(v) of tax
departure from proportionality by t/(1-t), the average rate of taxation expressed
as a proportion of net income
5. The second term on the right of (22) adjusts for
changes induced by T(X) to the income distribution of the yes answers to
question Q. Under progressive taxation, we expect this second term to be
negative since relative gainers under progressive taxation tend on average to be
less present in the distribution of the yes answers than if their presence had
remained described by KX/wX. If the tax system reranks individuals in the
5 This feature also links the Gini-based Kakwani (1977) index of tax
departure from proportionality and the Reynolds-Smolensky (1977) index of tax
redistribution.
8dimension of their income and thus causes horizontal inequity
6, this second term
C(v) will tend to be even more negative and will therefore further decrease the
net redistributive effect predicted by the term containing S(v). In the absence of
reranking, we can show
7 that a progressive tax system must generate a fall in
inequality, with R(v)>0.
Table 2 summarises the extreme values of wX(v), IX(v), IT
*(v), S(v), and
R(v) for v approaching 1 and infinity (defined for a>0). For v close to 1, we are
insensitive to inequality and we record no progressivity and no redistribution. As
v becomes very large, we measure inequality as a decreasing function of the
poorest individual’s share of total income, we measure tax departure from
proportionality as the fraction of the proportional tax which the poorest avoids
when he is charged T(a) instead of ta, and we measure redistribution as the
difference between the income share of the poorest under T(a) and his share
under proportional taxation.
VI. Illustration
We illustrate the use of the above indices of inequality, progressivity and
redistribution through an application to the British tax system. To this end, we
make use of the sample of 4471 families that appear in the British Family
Expenditure Survey (FES) data between April 8th and October 7th, 1985. The
FES is a continuous and reliable enquiry into the socio-economic characteristics
of private households in the United Kingdom and is carried out by the Office of
Population Censuses and Surveys on behalf of the Department of Employment.
Using this source of information, we compute a level of pre-tax income X that
6 On this, see, for instance, Plotnick (1982) and Duclos (1993).
7 Using the contributions of Jakobsson (1976) and Fellman (1976).
9includes a number of state and social security benefits
8. We then add to this the
regimes of personal income taxes and National Insurance contributions (NIC) that
prevailed in 1985 to yield a level of net income N. The marginal tax rates of the
1985 personal income tax regime range from 30% to 60% and apply to incomes
net of various personal allowances. NIC consist mainly of a tax of 9% on earned
income once a threshold of around 36£ a week is passed; marginal contributions
stop when a weekly upper income limit of 265£ is reached. To compare families
of different sizes and compositions, we use the equivalence scale implicit in the
main social assistance programme, Supplementary Benefit. The variables X, N
and T defined above must then be more properly understood as "equivalised"
incomes and taxes.
Figure 1 plots the values S(v) of the index of tax departure from
proportionality for each of the two taxes, against values
9 of v ranging from 1 to
5. We also show S(v) for the sum of the two taxes, which, as equation (21)
indicates, is simply a weighted average of the index for each of the two taxes.
Personal income taxes are everywhere deemed farther from proportionality than
NIC. Since the average rates of personal income taxation and of NIC are,
respectively, 15% and 5.3%, we note from equation (21) that the redistributive
role of personal taxation dominates by far the redistributive impact of NIC.
Values of S(v) increase for both taxes when v increases, showing that we
estimate the tax system to be farther from proportionality as we focus more on
the economically more deprived.
Figure 2 exhibits and decomposes the change in inequality when moving
from the pre-tax to the post-tax income distribution. As expected, inequality
indices IX(v) and IN(v) increase with v, moving from 0 to 0.47 for pre-tax income
8 We include among these benefits the level of Mortgage Interest Tax Relief.
More information on the survey and on the computations summarily described
here can be found in Duclos (1992).
9 Our discussion in much of the text implicitly assumed integer values for
v, but the various indices proposed here are in fact defined for any real v greater
than 1.
10and to 0.42 for post-tax income. From the inequality indices, the index wX(v) [or
wN(v)] of economic isolation of the poor can easily be calculated since it equals
1/[1-IX(v)]. This is shown in Table 3 for pre-tax and post-tax incomes, along with
the probability that a rich witness the consumption of a poor when making v-1
observations of consumption units. For v=3, for instance, we have IX(v)=0.37 and
wX(v)=1.58. A random individual sent with $3 on the condition that he must give
up the $3 if he encounters a poorer individual in the next 2 consumption units
he observes will, on average, make this encounter with a probability of only
1-1.58/3=0.47, and will therefore keep an expected amount of w=$1.58. In an
equal distribution of income, this expected amount would be of $1, yielding the
value of ($1.59-$1)/1.59$ = 0.37 for the inequality index. That is, an equal
distribution of income would have made him forego an additional 37% of what
he fails to give up because of the economic isolation of the poor. The index of
economic isolation increases with v and reaches a maximum at v=5 of 1.88 for
pre-tax income and 1.71 for post-tax income. With v=5, the progressivity of
taxation increases the average probability of observing the consumption of a
poorer person from 63% to 66%.
We also note on Figure 2 that the redistributive effects of taxes,
tS(v)/[(1-t)wX(v)], and the net effect, R(v), increase smoothly with v. The
correction term C(v) becomes less significant as a proportion of R(v) as v
increases. Income taxes and NIC cause a fall in the inequality of pre-tax income
of just above 10% for the whole range of v. As a percentage of pre-tax
inequality, therefore, the redistributive power of the British system of personal
income taxes and NIC does not seem to depend much on the distributional
sensitivity parameter v.
11VII. Conclusion
We propose a class of social evaluation functions that can be easily and
intuitively interpreted as the expected income of someone who finds himself
relatively poor as he observes the consumption of (v-1) random dollars. The
social evaluation functions and their associated inequality indices obey the
principle of transfers and are symmetric. The social evaluation functions are also
increasing along rays of income. The index of inequality is an intuitive function
of the isolation of the poor from the rich in their economic interactions. From
this, we derive associated classes of indices of tax departure from proportionality
and of tax redistribution, for which an important special case is the often-used
Suits index of progressivity. We are thus able to provide a social welfare and
inequality rationale for the use of that index. All indices are explicit functions of
a normative parameter v, a feature which stresses the sensitivity of all social
welfare, inequality, progressivity and redistribution judgements to normative
attitudes. We illustrate the application of the proposed indices using the British
regime of personal income taxes and National Insurance contributions. We find,
inter alia, that the British tax system reduces the income inequality indices by
about 10%, with personal income taxation causing most of that redistributive
impact. The indices of economic isolation of the poor also fall slightly, and the
probability of a rich observing the consumption of a poor rises by between 0.02

























































1.0 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
1.2 0.081 1.088 0.094 0.071 1.077 0.103
1.4 0.141 1.165 0.168 0.126 1.144 0.183
1.6 0.189 1.233 0.229 0.168 1.202 0.249
1.8 0.228 1.295 0.280 0.203 1.254 0.303
2.0 0.260 1.352 0.324 0.231 1.301 0.349
2.2 0.287 1.403 0.362 0.256 1.344 0.389
2.4 0.311 1.451 0.395 0.277 1.383 0.424
2.6 0.332 1.496 0.425 0.295 1.419 0.454
2.8 0.350 1.538 0.451 0.311 1.452 0.481
3.0 0.366 1.577 0.474 0.326 1.483 0.506
3.2 0.381 1.614 0.496 0.339 1.512 0.527
3.4 0.394 1.649 0.515 0.350 1.540 0.547
3.6 0.406 1.683 0.533 0.361 1.565 0.565
3.8 0.417 1.714 0.549 0.371 1.590 0.582
4.0 0.427 1.744 0.564 0.380 1.613 0.597
4.2 0.436 1.773 0.578 0.388 1.635 0.611
4.4 0.445 1.801 0.591 0.396 1.655 0.624
4.6 0.453 1.827 0.603 0.403 1.675 0.636
4.8 0.460 1.853 0.614 0.410 1.694 0.647
5.0 0.467 1.877 0.625 0.416 1.712 0.658
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